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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Chul Boylon Gibbs appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
discovered as the result of a traffic stop conducted on Interstate 84. In the district court,
Mr. Gibbs asserted his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer deviated from
the original purpose of the stop to take time to call for a drug dog. The district court agreed the
officer deviated from the original purpose of the stop when he took 30 seconds to make the call;
however, the court denied suppression after concluding the deviation was justified by reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants were engaged in criminal activity.
On appeal, Mr. Gibbs asserts the district court was correct in concluding that the officer’s
call deviated from the mission of the traffic stop, but that the court erred in holding the deviation
was justified by reasonable suspicion.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s threshold assertion that the 30-second
call was too short of a delay to violate the Fourth Amendment (see Resp.Br., p.14), and to clarify
that under the controlling precedent, even de minimis intrusions on a person’s Fourth
Amendment rights are violations of the Fourth Amendment.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Gibbs’s Appellant’s Brief. They are not repeated in this Reply Brief.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gibbs’ motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gibbs’ Motion To Suppress
Contrary to the State’s assertion (Resp.Br., p.10), the district court correctly ruled that
Officer Cagle deviated from the purpose of the traffic stop when he took time to call for a drug
dog. The district court found, based on the undisputed evidence presented, that the officer called
for the drug dog after returning to his patrol car with the driver’s license, insurance and
registration information, but before he began the process of running the checks on that
information, and the court further found that this call lasted 30 seconds. (R., p.109.) The district
court held:
Although the delay to request a K-9 unit was brief, there is no de minimis
exception to the rule requiring that the detention of the person be supported by
reasonable suspicion. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16. A deviation from the
original purpose of a traffic stop “will inevitably lengthen the time needed to
complete the original purpose of the seizure.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. Further,
“[t]he rule isn’t concerned with when the officer deviates from the original
purpose of the traffic stop, it is concerned with the fact that the officer deviates
from the original purpose of the stop at all. Id. at 609.
When Sergeant Cagle deviated from the original purpose of the traffic stop, he
initiated a “new seizure with a new purpose ... which requires its own
reasonableness.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 609.
(R., p.110.)
On appeal, the State argues that the district court erred in concluding that the 30-second
call was a deviation that counts under the Fourth Amendment, and asserts the delay is too brief to
require Fourth Amendment justification. (Resp. Br., p.10.) The State acknowledges the binding
precedent which holds that de minimis intrusions are still Fourth Amendment violations, and
cited Rodriguez v. United States, 757 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015), and State v. Linze, 161
Idaho 605 (2016) in its briefing. (See Resp.Br., p.10.) However, the State suggests that this
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holding should be limited to the narrow facts in each of case, which involved delays of minutes
rather than seconds. (Resp. Br., p.10.)
The State’s argument is without merit. Under the clear holdings of Rodriguez and Linze,
even so-called de minimis intrusions of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights violate the Fourth
Amendment. See Rodriguez, 757 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 612 (2015) (explicitly rejecting the
proffered “de minimis rule” that would otherwise permit brief intrusions on personal liberty); see
also Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 n.2 (2016) (“the United States Supreme Court was clear in
Rodriguez that de minimis exceptions are no longer available”). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme
Court has recognized the holding of Rodriquez to be “both broad and inflexible.” Linze, at 608.
Under the controlling precedent, and as a matter of law, an officer who prolongs a traffic stop –
no matter how briefly – without reasonable suspicion to conduct an unrelated inquiry, violates
the Fourth Amendment. The State’s assertion that the 30-second call is too brief to violate the
Fourth Amendment should be rejected.
The State points out that in State v. McGraw, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated, in dicta,
that “Counting every pause taken while writing a citation as conduct that unlawfully adds time to
the stop is inimical to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and is contrary to
United States Supreme Court precedent.” 163 Idaho 736, 741 (Ct. App. 2018). It is unclear what
the Court of Appeals intended by this statement, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s and the Idaho
Supreme Court’s clear holdings that police may not “incrementally” prolong a stop, and given
their explicit rejection of the proffered de minimis rule.

Rodriguez, 757 U.S. at _, 135

S.Ct. at 1615-16; Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. Whether Court of Appeal’s statement in McGraw
signals its disagreement with, disappointment in, or misunderstanding of Rodriguez and Linze, or
something else, such a statement does not alter the controlling law of the land.
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As to the district court’s subsequent – and erroneous – conclusion that the deviation was
justified by reasonable suspicion, Mr. Gibbs refers this Court to the argument set forth in his
Appellant’s Brief, at pages 11-18. The State’s argument to the contrary is unremarkable. (See
Resp.Br., pp.11-21.)

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and those stated in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gibbs
respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying suppression, vacate his
judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia,
and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2019.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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